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Abstract
The German constitution declares in its ﬁ rst Amendment that human dignity is 
inviolable and declares its protection as a duty of the state. The following text explores 
the concept of human dignity as “a right to have rights” that can be derived from 
this constitutional passage. References to different decisions of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court reveal the importance and complexity of this concept and its 
meaning for the understanding and interpretation of the German Constitution as such.
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Resumo
A Constituição Alemã declara em sua primeira Emenda que a dignidade humana é 
inviolável e declara sua proteção, um dever do Estado. O seguinte texto explora 
o conceito de dignidade humana como “um direito a ter direito” que pode ser 
derivado dessa passagem constitucional. Referências a diferentes decisões da Corte 
Constitucional Federal Alemã revelam a importância e a complexidade desse conceito 
e de seu signiﬁ cado para o entendimento e a interpretação da Constituição Alemã 
como tal.
Palavras-chave: direitos humanos, dignidade humana, Alemanha.
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Preface
Legal, moral and political meaning of 
the commitment to human dignity
Art. 1 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic 
of Germany2:
(i)  Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect 
and protect it shall be duty of all state authority.
(ii)  The German people, therefore, acknowledge 
inviolable and inalienable human rights as the 
basis of every community, of peace and of 
justice in the world.
(iii)  The following basic rights shall bind the 
legislature, the executive and the judiciary as 
directly applicable law.
Like a mighty tree deeply rooted in the tradition 
of humanity, the commitment to human dignity towers 
above the landscape of German constitutional law 
– a tree that protects against wind and weather, that 
provides pleasant shadow and most of all provides plenty 
of fruit upon which people live day by day. However, to 
reach to the inner core of the ramiﬁ ed structure, one 
has to dispose lots of proliferation and ivy that may look 
pretty at ﬁ rst sight but is not part of the tree and might 
even be harmful to it.
Hence, the interest in human dignity demands 
that the constitutional jurist – like a good gardener 
– proceeds with certain strictness, to extract as to 
how the constitutional clause of the inviolability 
of human dignity is understood correctly. Yet, this 
effort towards stringency is not only required by 
jurisprudential seriousness but also by political 
culture. Josef Isensee claimed in an essay from 2006 
that behind this constitutional clause there hides the 
“article of faith of a civil religion” (Isensee, 2006a, p. 
179). This describes very well the social and political 
reality, where the guarantee of human dignity is 
worshipped as such an article of faith. Certainly, 
opponents of this “civil religion” will not be banned 
completely from the community as J.J. Rousseau 
once suggested (Rousseau, 1977, p. 140 et seq., 4th 
book, chapter 8). Though, whoever disregards human 
dignity – or what it is considered to be – and, thus, 
stands out as an opponent of the “civil religion” is 
morally unacceptable and excluded from the social 
and political discourse. In other words, the one who 
ﬁ ghts for human dignity does not need additional 
arguments for his justiﬁ cation. Human dignity marks 
the line between “good guys” and “bad guys”. So 
we see, it is important to ﬁ nd out the meaning and 
function of this constitutional clause as precisely 
as possible, not only because it is an important 
constitutional rule and jurists are, therefore, obliged 
to work especially careful but, also, because of its 
moral and political importance. 
The meaning of Article 1 GG: 
Intentions of the framers of the 
constitution and the clause’s position 
in the constitution 
The meaning of human dignity cannot be 
disclosed by a strictly textual approach. The precise 
meaning of this clause in the context of the German 
Basic Law only emerges from the clause’s origin and the 
constitutional text’s system.
The Parliamentary Council (Parlamentarischer 
Rat) – the political institution that drafted the German 
Basic Law in 1949 – intended the entire regulation of 
Article 1 to serve as a “preamble” for the chapter of 
fundamental rights and to clarify their spirit and purpose. 
No less, no more. Hence, the statement on human 
dignity should not provide a new fundamental right. The 
intention of the Parliamentary Council was to make 
the “classical” fundamental rights directly applicable 
and binding. Positively standardized guarantees should 
exhaustively interpret the open and – without normative 
concretion – not executable “un-interpreted thesis” of 
human dignity (cp. Enders, 1997, p. 416; Isensee, 2006b,
p. 48, 86 seq. with further references).
These intentions of the Parliamentary Council 
are clearly reﬂ ected in the constitutional system: The 
commitment to human dignity opens the chapter of 
fundamental rights of the German Basic Law, i.e. the 
individual’s rights primarily addressing and restricting 
the state. Article 1 of the German Basic Law states that 
human dignity is the reason why the German people 
commit themselves to human rights. The Basic Law 
furthermore constitutionally guarantees – as Article 1 
Section 3 indicates – speciﬁ c (“following”) fundamental 
rights that give a precise legal meaning to the notion of 
human rights so they can be applied (c. Art. 1 sec. 3 of 
the German Basic Law). 
2 Grundgesetz (GG). 
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Human Dignity as “right to rights” 
and its function in the constitution
Constitutional legal practice soon deﬁ ed 
those limits of interpretation that were given to 
possible legal effects of the principle of human dignity. 
Requirements of the legal practice and of politics 
lead into a different direction and encouraged a more 
substantive understanding. Today, the German Federal 
Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) charac-
terises human dignity as the supreme principle of 
the constitution3 and every now and then also as a 
fundamental right.4 
However, if we stay with the unbiased 
interpretation of the constitutional text regardless 
of later result – or situation-oriented modiﬁ cations 
and additions, we must state: The constitutional rule 
of human dignity does not contain a legal guarantee, 
because this quality of individuals is a constitutional 
a priori and cannot be subject to legal regulation. The 
individual as such – irrespective of governmental 
organisation – is subject of rights and duties, and 
precisely this constitutes his or her dignity. So, the 
constitutional principle of human dignity recognises 
the individual as a moral person and postulates his or 
her original right to have rights (Enders, 1997, p. 427-
431, 433, 502). Hence, if the individual was not subject 
of speciﬁ c rights that he or she owned without 
presuppositions, he or she would be a mere object of 
the arbitrariness of others (Dürig, 1956, p. 119, 122). 
Consequently, we should emphasise: No overall 
and absolute “super-basic-right” can be derived from 
Article 1 of the German Basic Law. Normally, human 
dignity is sufﬁ ciently protected by the special fundamental 
rights. Therefore, the commitment to human dignity 
is to be understood as a constitutional principle that 
reminds the “raison d’être” (reason of existence) of the 
constitutional state under the rule of law (Rechtsstaat) 
and that postulates human beings’ original right to have 
rights. However, human dignity cannot be referred to as 
a “passepartout” as this would undermine the carefully 
worked out interdependency of the explicit provisions 
set up in the constitution and level their normative 
differences. 
The Protection of human dignity by 
means of fundamental rights
The “normal” case concerning 
fundamental rights
The German Federal Constitutional Court has 
occasionally considered human dignity as such as a 
fundamental right.5 When giving it a closer look, one can 
see that this is merely held in obiter and always in cases 
where human dignity was not of decisive relevance. The 
reason is that a “fundamental right to human dignity” 
– because of its absoluteness that does not tolerate re-
lativisation – is unmanageable as a fundamental right. 
Plus: there is no need for such a fundamental right, since 
human dignity is adequately protected by the fundamen-
tal rights that follow the “preamble” of Art. 1 German 
Basic Law (c.  Art. 1 Section 3: “the following fundamental 
rights”). These fundamental rights derive, as acknowl-
edged by the Federal Constitutional Court, from the gen-
eral right of the individual to be treated as a person, i.e. to 
be treated lawfully. This right is recognised in Article 1 GG. 
Special cases of constitutional protection 
of individual freedom and integrity
Moreover, the German Basic Law explicitly regulates 
particularly important cases concerning the protection 
of individual freedom and integrity – for instance by 
proscribing death penalty or the physical and mental abuse 
of detained persons.6 This indicates that these guarantees 
– although they surely are essential for the self-fulﬁ lment 
and the maintenance of the individual – do not derive self-
evidently from the commitment to human dignity. 
Interpretation and justiﬁ cation 
of freedom guarantee from the 
perspective of human dignity
Interpretation: The so called “allgemeines 
Persönlichkeitsrecht”
These explanations do not want to deny that a
 glance at human dignity can enlighten the purpose of par-
3 Federal Constitutional Court, January 16, 1957 (BVerfGE 6, 32, 36) and February 15, 2006 (BVerfGE 115, 118, 152).
4 Federal Constitutional Court, February 5, 2004 (BVerfGE 109, 133, 181).
5 Federal Constitutional Court, February 5, 2004 (BVerfGE 109, 133, 181).
6 Art. 102 of German Basic Law: “Capital punishment is abolished”;  Art. 104 Sec. 1, 2nd Sent. of German Basic German Law: “Persons in custody may not be subject to 
mental or physical mistreatment”.
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ticular fundamental rights. The most important example
for this role of the constitutional commitment to human 
dignity is the interpretation of  Article 2 Section 1 of 
the German Basic Law.7 It is generally accepted that this 
fundamental right primarily protects the so called general 
freedom of action (allgemeine Handlungsfreiheit), i.e. the 
freedom to do whatever one wants, which is only limited
by the equal freedom of every other person. The 
German jurisdiction connected this fundamental
principle of external freedom with human dignity and
named this synopsis of Article 1 and Article 2 Section 1 
GG “allgemeines Persönlichkeitsrecht”8 (general right
of the human personality) to make clear that the 
external freedom of the individual is based on internal 
preconditions9. The commitment to human dignity high-
lights the interrelation of the particular facets of the 
“allgemeine Persönlichkeitsrecht”. Their common centre
of reference is the individual’s self-determination10. 
This aspect has recently been enhanced by the Federal 
Constitutional Court to the fundamental right to privacy 
and integrity of IT-systems.11  
Fundamental rights of unborn children?
However, one should not overestimate the 
possibilities of human dignity, for instance in cases 
concerning the legal status of the embryo. The question 
arises, whether the embryo can be considered as a 
human being that is entitled to human dignity and hence 
to the right to life in the sense of the Basic Law or 
not. Consequently, if we consider the embryo to have 
human dignity its status as a legal person and holder 
of fundamental rights is determined. Thus, that would
mean that the extinction of unborn life without strong 
and legally recognised justiﬁ cation is generally illegal.
The German Federal Constitutional Court solves 
this problem by applying the so called “thesis of continui-
ty”, stating that the development of the fertilised ovum to 
a born child forms a process that disallows any gradation 
of legal protection.12 The German Basic Law, however, 
does not make a statement in regard to the particular 
date of the beginning of a person’s legal status. In fact, 
legal systems have always independently interpreted and 
accentuated the natural-biological continuity. 
At this point, one has to remember that the 
constitutional commitment to human dignity is a com-
mitment to fundamental rights only within their tradition-
al meaning. According to this meaning the legal status as 
a person begins with a person’s birth. In Europe, this was 
the well-deﬁ ned position of the modern civil legislation, 
inﬂ uenced by the declarations of human rights. Under 
§ 1 of the German Civil Code (BGB) a human being is 
capable of holding rights only with the completion of his 
or her birth. Consequently, the established parlance of
the dignity and rights every human individual is born with
is valid also for the Basic Law.  Moreover, this interpretation 
that the legal status of a person only begins with his or 
her birth is in compliance with common European legal 
standards. The European Court of Human Rights has so far 
stated in two cases that the right to life (Article 2 ECHR) 
does not apply to the embryo since it is not a legal person.13 
Such a perspective does not prevent a society from 
protecting the unborn human life by the means of criminal 
law. And this indeed might be indicated by a general respect 
for human life. This was meant by the ECHR when it stated 
that unborn life required protection “in the name of human 
dignity”. However, these measures are not linked to and 
therefore are not demanded by a personal right to life14. 
The constitutional requirement to 
respect and protect human dignity 
(limitation and justiﬁ cation of 
intrusions into freedom)
Two sides of legal effect – 
structural dimensions
Solely from the commitment to human dignity 
a fundamental right of its own does not derive. 
7 Article 2 of the German Basic Law: (i) Every person shall have the right to free development of his personality insofar as he does not violate the rights of others or 
offend against the constitutional order or the moral law. (ii) Every person shall have the right to life and physical integrity. Freedom of the person shall be inviolable. 
These rights may be interfered with only pursuant to a law.
8 Cp. e.g. Federal Civil Court, May 25, 1954 (BGHZ 13, 334), April 2, 1957 (BGHZ 24, 72), Federal Constitutional Court, June 3, 1980 (BVerfGE 54, 148).
9 This fundamental right includes the protection of privacy (right to privacy). It protects not only a person’s physical space or solitude but also the self-determination 
of the individual as such (including information privacy or the right to one’s own picture etc.).
10 That is why corporate bodies cannot claim some of those legal guarantees.
11 Federal Constitutional Court, February 27, 2008 (BVerfGE 120, 274).
12 Federal Constitutional Court, February  25, 1975 (BVerfGE 39, 1) and May 28, 1993 (BVerfGE 88, 203).
13 Vo v. France, ECHR No. 53924/00, July 8, 2004; conﬁ rmed in Evans vs. United Kingdom, ECHR No. 6339/05, March 7, 2006.
14 The decisions of the German Federal Constitutional Court, February  25, 1975 (BVerfGE 39, 1) and May 28, 1993 (BVerfGE 88, 203) concerning abortion have shown 
that it is only a short step from the principle of absolute protection of the embryonic existence to modiﬁ cations that undermine the same principle and are not really 
convincing.
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Individual protection of human dignity is ensured by 
the “following fundamental rights”, Article 2 seqq. The 
relation to human dignity only sets the benchmark of 
constitutional interpretation that should not be used to 
level (particular) substantial and legal conditions. Thus, 
another function of this commitment is more important: 
it establishes a constitutional rule that marks the 
reason and foundation of all legal forms of freedom and 
therefore does not take into account the particularities 
and contingencies of a concrete case. Therefore, it is 
not open to any weighing approach, trying to balance 
opposing interests. That has two effects: 
On the one hand the commitment to respect 
and protect human dignity restricts the authorities, 
especially if they infringe fundamental rights. Human 
dignity delivers the absolutely insurmountable barrier 
to governmental measures inﬂ icting fundamental rights
(“Schranken-Schranke”), may they be justiﬁ ed in other 
respects. By crossing this barrier the individual – 
contrary to his or her status as a legal person – would 
be treated as a mere object. This is strictly prohibited to 
the authorities.
On the other hand, reasons that justify restrictions of 
freedom also may result from the imperative to respect 
and protect human dignity. Any violation of human dignity 
is prohibited to anyone, even to private individuals. 
Legislation is called to statutorily implement this prohibit, 
as well as the courts are to enforce those rules.
The limitation of governmental 
interference with freedoms, 
especially in favour of privacy
In the major decisions of the Federal Constitu-
tional Court human dignity operates as an absolute barrier 
to governmental interferences with individual funda-
mental rights. For the ﬁ rst time this concept was applied 
in the decision concerning the constitutionality of an 
amendment allowing wiretapping15 (c. Article 10 of the
German Basic Law). Furthermore, it was applied in 
the decision concerning the constitutionality of life 
imprisonment.16 Here the Court had to decide whether 
life imprisonment – because of its duration – violates 
human dignity and therefore constitutes an infringement 
of personal liberty (Article 2 Section 2 Sentence 2 of the 
German Basic Law). Most recently human dignity served 
as an absolute barrier for state measures infringing the 
right to life in the decision that dealt with the statutory 
allowance of the armed forces to shoot down aircrafts 
(Article 2 Section 2 Sentence 1 of the German Basic 
Law).17 The Court had to decide whether the lives of 
uninvolved passengers and crew of a hijacked aircraft 
may be sacriﬁ ced in order to ﬁ ght terrorism or if this 
would amount to an illegal balancing of human lives with 
other rights and legally protected interests. 
Mainly, human dignity fulﬁ ls this function of 
restricting the legislator in cases concerning the 
protection of an absolutely inviolable sphere. A second 
glance on these questions might be useful not at least 
because they arise in regard to criminal investigation. 
The Federal Constitutional Court for instance had to 
decide whether it is allowed to use a personal diary 
as evidence against the accused in a criminal trial18, 
or, whether (secret) acoustical surveillance could 
be allowed by a constitutional amendment of the 
fundamental right guaranteeing the inviolability of the 
home (Article 13 of the German Basic Law).19 Yet, the 
legal effect of the “dignity-argument” in these cases is 
of lesser relevance than its claim for absoluteness. The 
absolutely inviolable realm (of privacy) is deﬁ ned (from 
case to case) in regard to the social relevance of the 
behaviour involved and, thus, depends on the security 
concerns of the general public. If a person – perhaps 
along with others – plans a criminal act it does not 
matter in which form or in which place these plans 
become apparent as long as they affect third parties 
or the community and touch upon the social sphere. 
Hence, the general public has a legitimate interest to 
ﬁ nd out about these plans to prevent damages. For this 
purpose it is irrelevant, whether the suspected person 
is naked or dressed, showers or lies in a marriage bed 
or speaks to the family circle, while making such plans. 
Same principles apply to criminal investigation.
The authorities, therefore, are allowed to gain the 
information needed in case of reasonable suspicion even if 
this means to take notice of purely private circumstances. 
Otherwise the suspicion could never be substantiated or 
nulliﬁ ed. It is the surveillance itself that shows whether 
an activity is purely private or relevant under legal 
15 Federal Constitutional Court, December 15, 1970 (BVerfGE 30, 1). 
16 Federal Constitutional Court, June 21, 1977 (BVerfGE 45, 187).
17 Federal Constitutional Court, February 15, 2006 (BVerfGE 115, 118), cp. supra note 4.
18 Federal Constitutional Court, September 14, 1989 (BVerfGE 80, 367).
19 Federal Constitutional Court, March 3, 2004 (BVerfGE 109, 279).
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aspects, especially concerning criminal law. Thus, there is 
no absolutely protected sphere of privacy. The Federal 
Constitutional Court therefore speaks of the “protection 
of the core area of privacy on two levels”.20 
First level: As a general rule personal data is not 
to be collected unless it is relevant data in legal terms. 
However, to verify or falsify this relevance they must 
be collected in the ﬁ rst place (in case of suspicion). 
Second level: If the collected personal data turns out to 
be irrelevant it must be deleted immediately and – most 
of all – may not be presented to a court for evidence. 
This proves that an absolutely protected area of privacy 
does not exist. Only absolutely uninteresting data enjoys 
absolute protection.
The justiﬁ cation of liberties limitations 
through human dignity
Moreover, the principle of human dignity may 
be invoked to justify limitations of liberties. There is a 
number of prohibitions – partly concerning criminal law 
– that are or might be connected to the protection of 
human dignity (for instance, disturbance of the peace of 
the dead, § 168 of the German Criminal Code (StGB), or 
disparagement of the deceased’s memory, § 189 of the 
German Criminal Code constitute criminal offences). 
In fact, to some extent they protect individual interests 
and also public interests, especially culturally-rooted 
customs of decency, comity and propriety (cultural 
identity), that usually are summarized under the term 
of “moral law” (c. Article 2 Section 1 of the German 
Basic Law). 
In any way it is problematic when legislature and 
legal practice invoke human dignity to impose imperatives 
and prohibitions of certain behaviour as self-evident and 
maintain them even if the behaviour does not affect any 
other individual against his or her will. 
Absolute bounds to governmental 
measures (problematic cases)
Shooting down aircrafts: The relativity of 
the protection of life
Human life is only relatively protected. The state, 
under certain circumstances, can (legally) take away 
life. However, the limits of the admissible seem surely 
crossed if a plane hijacked by terrorists is shot down 
together with crew and passengers to avert danger from 
the community. In this situation, it is not only a decision 
on the right to life of the ones responsible for the attack, 
who would have to face defence (anyway), but, also, on 
the rights of the uninvolved innocent persons. They 
are sacriﬁ ced in the name of the community’s integrity. 
Their right to exist, which every human being is entitled 
to by virtue of being human, seems to be balanced with 
other interests and subordinated as inferior. However, 
to scale the persons’ value and to compare them to one 
another would be inadmissible. 
Yet, this consideration ignores the point that 
human life is not protected as a pure natural-biological 
fact. The right to life, however, as a right is subject to 
the condition of the “state of law”, without whom 
no enforceable law would exist. Thus, in extremely 
exceptional cases, for example in a state of war but 
also in other states of emergency, where the defence 
of the civil society against systematic attacks otherwise 
would not be possible, it is allowed to sacriﬁ ce the life 
of individuals. These individuals are the beneﬁ ciaries of 
the legal state, and are sacriﬁ ced to preserve this legal 
state. Shooting down an aircraft under these conditions 
therefore does not infringe upon human dignity. The 
question whether this is proportional is, however, a 
different one. 
In 2006, the German Federal Constitutional 
Court ruled differently: The authority to shoot down 
a hijacked plane (as given in the Aviation Security 
Act20) was held to be unconstitutional.21 The Court 
dealt with my argument as presented here and – not 
without internal antilogy – did not completely rule out 
the possibility that there might be situations where the 
sacriﬁ ce of human lives does not violate the constitu-
tion. Otherwise, one could hardly imagine how to justify 
the sortie of soldiers, especially of draftees (Enders, 2007,
p. 1043-1044).
Absolute limitation: Denegation 
and evasion of law 
It seems as if numerous questions that are 
debated in legal literature and praxis should not be 
discussed under aspects of human dignity but be solved 
from the perspective of individual fundamental rights 
20 Federal Constitutional Court, March 3, 2004 (BVerfGE 109, 279). 
21 Luftsicherheitsgesetz, BGBl I 2005, p. 78.
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and the principle of proportionality. Still, there are 
absolute bounds to authorities. However, these bounds 
do not result in detail from Article 1 Section 1 Sentence 
1 of the German Basic Law but from the principle laid 
down in Article 1 Sections 1 to 3 of the German Basic 
Law. According to this principle authorities are legally 
bound because the individual does not only hold (legal) 
obligations but also rights. Any systematic denial or 
evasion of law, therefore, violates Article 1 of the German 
Basic Law. If the state disregards the necessity to use 
formally as well as substantially lawful means then the 
individual’s legal status is denied and he or she is treated 
as a mere object. Such infringements undermine the
rule of law as such and, hence, may not be justiﬁ ed un-
der any circumstances, not even in states of emergency.
From this a presumption of freedom in favour of 
the individuals follows. Governmental restrictions of the 
individual sphere of freedom are not legitimated merely 
by their good intention. They must be justiﬁ ed, namely 
by contributing to constitute and to enforce obligations 
of (external) conduct. Only obligations of conduct in a 
certain way can constitute legal obligations. Any behav-
iour that might not be subjected to such a legal obligation 
(for instance one’s internal attitudes that do not show) 
cannot be legally demanded. Another consequence of
the state’s obligation to justify their measures is a min-
imum standard of legal, i.e. jurisdictional, control.
Particular cases of denegation and evasion 
of law
(a) Cases of denegation of law
Thus, the pursuit of certain purposes is denied to 
the authorities because of their obligation to act lawfully. 
A modern constitutional state has to avoid paternalism. 
Moral acting or a decent conduct of life must not be 
dictated, for the state is not a reformatory. 
Most of all, the authorities are not allowed to 
systematically interfere through coercive measures 
with the internal process by which the individual sets 
his or her purposes. This would diametrically oppose 
the idea of self-determination (autonomy). When being 
(coercively) inﬂ uenced by the state, the individual is 
driven into an irresolvable (internal) conﬂ ict with his or 
her self-determination. The independent development 
of an identity, hence, would be rendered impossible and 
the autonomous individual would be made an object 
of heteronomous purposes. An other-directed power 
over the internal process of identity-building cannot 
be subjected to an effective external legal obligation. 
Attempts in that direction go beyond the legal scope 
and corresponding measures therefore are forbidden.
That is why torture is unconditionally prohibited 
and not even a constitutional amendment could make
it legal. Also, the privilege against coercive self-in-
crimination (nemo tenetur se ipsum accusare) results 
from these considerations. 
 (b) Cases of evasion of law – the obligation
to justify governmental measures
Not only is the state prohibited to deny the 
law, state authorities must also not evade it. Although 
privacy is not absolutely protected, any secret inves-
tigation is basically illegal. If they are carried out 
nonetheless in the better interest of all or any person, 
they must be disclosed to the person affected when 
they have ﬁ nished. Otherwise, this person would have 
no possibility to obtain judicial control and the state’s 
duty to give reasons and thereby justify its action would, 
hence, become useless. 
A similar argument applies to governmental 
measures taken against unsuspected persons. As a 
result from the duty to justify their measures the public 
authorities (always) at least have to substantiate the 
suspicion that certain behaviour is dangerous or harm-
ful. If there was a general competence to restrict individ-
ual rights without any given suspicion, the state would 
again systematically undermine its obligation to justify 
its action. That would be an absolutely unacceptable 
reversal of the general presumption of freedom and a 
disregard for the requirement for justiﬁ cation that goes 
along with it. Evidence obtained by secret investigation 
or by investigation against unsuspected persons is 
inadmissible.
These considerations are clearly taken into 
account by the Federal Constitutional Court in its 
decision on public surveillance using malicious spy 
ware to get access to computers.22 The Constitutional 
Court, however, based its decision on the principle 
of proportionality. In addition, this argument is not 
convincing: The principle of proportionality is intended 
to provide solutions in individual cases and therefore 
is – by any reckoning – a blunt instrument. The 
22 Federal Constitutional Court, February 27, 2008 (BVerfGE 120, 274). 
Enders  |  The Right to have Rights: The concept of human dignity in German Basic Law
8 Revista de Estudos Constitucionais, Hermenêutica e Teoria do Direito (RECHTD), 2(1):1-8
broader the purpose of governmental measures is 
deﬁ ned (like the preservation of the state’s existence 
or the maximum safety for everybody) the more and 
more severe measures become admissible. Moreover, 
complete safety may only be achieved if the presumption 
of freedom is abandoned and replaced by a general 
suspicion against everybody. An absolute boundary 
is, thus, not drawn by the principle of proportionality 
but only by the requirement for justiﬁ cation, which is 
subsequent to the rule of law. Also, situations where 
the Constitutional Court upheld exceptions allowing 
such measures in favour of intelligence operations 
(protection of the constitution) can only be explained 
and reasonably conﬁ ned by deﬁ ning concrete public 
tasks, on the one hand, and on the other hand, strictly 
limiting them according to this purpose. Only then, the 
normal situation can to some extent be distinguished 
from its exceptions.
Conclusion
The commitment to human dignity as expressed 
in Article 1 Section 1 GG indeed constitutes a consti-
tutional concept: It stipulates that all law has to emanate 
from the individual’s status as a legal subject; further-
more that all law is to be construed and interpreted
from that status and has to converge in that status. 
Thus, the state is put under the rule of law. The rela-
tion between citizens and government is one of mutual 
rights and duties, basically just like social interrelations 
between citizens. That means: If one is sure about 
how such a state is constituted – which according 
to the German tradition is known as “Rechtsstaat” 
(constitutional state under the rule of law) – then there 
is no need to emphatically proclaim human dignity as 
the very purpose of statehood. A state that does not 
base its legal order on the commitment to human 
dignity may still be a constitutional state under the 
rule of law. However, the opposite is also true: If in a 
certain historical and social situation the requirements 
of the rule of law fall into oblivion, then even the 
incantation of human dignity and its inviolability is void. 
After considering these arguments human dignity is 
not more than a buzz phrase that does spare neither 
the assumption of political responsibility nor careful 
jurisprudential work. 
Still, the commitment to human dignity reminds 
the legislator, the courts and other jurists to always 
keep clearly in mind that the human is a self-conscious 
intellectual and ethical being and therefore worthy 
of respect. It is another difﬁ culty and, yet, unsolved 
question whether this ideal – that has its roots in the 
ideas of Enlightenment, in the revolutionary declarations 
of human rights, but also in religious traditions – will 
be sustainable and really have universal validity in a 
globalised world. The answer to this question has to go 
beyond the national constitutional context and is not at 
all certain.  
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